Abstract. With equitable key escrow the control of society o ver the individual and the control of the individual over society are shared fairly. In particular, the control is limited to speci ed time periods. We consider two applications: time controlled key escrow and time controlled auctions with closed bids. In the rst the individual cannot be targeted outside the period authorized by the court. In the second the individual cannot withhold his closed bid beyond the bidding period. We propose two protocols, one for each application. We d o not require the use of temper-proof devices.
Introduction
Key escrow has been proposed as a mechanism to protect society from individuals who use a communication system for criminal purposes 4, 24, 10] (an excellent survey of key escrow systems is given by D.E. Denning and D.K. Branstad in 11]). However key escrow can also be used to target innocent individuals. This potential targeting is a major factor which c o n tributes to the social unacceptability o f k ey escrow. >From the point of view of an individual, key escrow m a y restrict his/her privacy and give c o n trolling power to society (Big Brother 8]), which m a y, in certain circumstances, abuse it. In a society oriented key escrow this power must be equally shared between the individual and society (for an analysis of fair cryptosystems see 24, 2 2 ]). Furthermore it must have a limited life span. Indeed a major objection to currently proposed key escrow s c hemes is that there is no e ective time control. Once an order to recover a key by the escrow agents has been given, there is nothing to prevent the agents from abusing their power and decrypting all wire-tapped messages, far beyond the time speci ed by the Court order. Various scenarios can be envisaged in which a threat against a minority is indeed serious. While the Bellare{Goldwasser 3] scheme protects a majority against Big Brother, it does not protect a minority. For example, an extremist group aiming to take c o n trol of the government c a n wire-tap all communication of suspect dissidents, which w ould then be decrypted when the group took over control.
It is essential that the control of the escrow agents be limited to speci ed time periods, beyond which it should not be possible for the agents to recover the \old" private keys of a targeted individual. For this purpose we h a ve c hosen in our rst application of equitable key escrow, to update the keys at regular intervals, and to make it infeasible to compute old keys from the new key. The escrow agents must destroy all the shares of the old keys with each updating. We can allow for a small number of corrupted agents who keep their old shares, but these should not be su cient to reconstruct the keys.
Our second application of equitable key escrow i s c o n tract bidding. In this case it is the individual who may try to abuse society. T o prevent a t e n d e r from being opened before the speci ed date, it is encrypted with an escrowed key. The bidder must have s o m e c o n trol over the encryption otherwise one can envisage situations in which the escrow agents may collude with a corrupted receiving agent. This threat can be eliminated if the bidder pre-encrypts the bid with his/her own key. H o wever the bidder may then withhold the key. T h e r e are several scenarios in which s u c h a threat may be of concern. For example, if altered circumstances make the bid unpro table, or loss making. In this case, it is \society" (the receiving o ce) which is threatened by the individual (the bidder). The solution we propose is to force the bidder to use a weak encryption key (a nice discussion on the use of weak keys is given in 28]). This imposes a time limit which should make it possible for the agents to recover the bid after the tender is opened. Two k eys are used: a key for the bidder and an escrowed key. The pair of these keys can be regarded as an enlarged escrow k ey, i n w h i c h the share of the bidder is her/his key while the shares of the agents are their old shares. In this way the bidder is included in all authorized sets.
Our goal in this paper is to design protocols which a c hieve equitable key escrow. For this purpose we c o m bine the threshold scheme of Boyd 7] , the ElGamal threshold scheme of Desmedt{Frankel 14] and add time dependency. The organization of this paper has as follows. In Section 2 we present our rst protocol for a time controlled key escrow system and discuss its security. In Section 3 we present a protocol for time controlled auctions with closed bids.
Notation and Background
Let p be a prime and g 2 Z p an element of large order. All operations in Z p are performed modulo p. F or simplicity, and when there is no ambiguity, w e drop the operator \modp". We also write x 2 R X to indicate that the element x is selected uniformly at random from the set X, independently of all other selections.
The ), given z g x is the symmetric Di e-Hellman decision problem. If this problem is hard then so are the Di e-Hellman problem, the Di e-Hellman decision problem and the symmetric Di e-Hellman decision problem. We will also consider the problem of nding elements with large order in Z p . T h i s i s related to Problem C19 in the Adleman{McCurley list of open problems in Number Theoretic Complexity 1 ], and is considered to be hard.
Time controlled key escrow
For simplicity w e focus on a basic`-out-of-`escrow system. We will discuss generalizations to other access structures later on.
Our system uses a Discrete Logarithm setting with prime modulus p and g 2 Z p an appropriate element of large order. Initially, at time t = 0, the private key of the receiver, Bob, is a 2 R Z p;1 and the public key is y 0 = g a mod p. B o b shares his private key among`escrow agents EA i , i = 1 2 : : : .
In our basic model each agent gets a share s i 2 R Z p;1 (i = 1 2 : : : ; 1), and s`is such t h a t s 1 s 2 s`= a mod (p ; 1). The main feature of our system is that the private key of Bob and its shares are updated at regular intervals without the need for interaction. At time t, the private key of Bob is updated to a 2 t mod (p ; 1), the shares are updated to s i 2 t mod (p ; 1), and the public key is updated to y t = g a 2 t mod p. The agents EA i compute the new shares by themselves, and must destroy the old shares. As a consequence, the escrow a g e n ts cannot decrypt a ciphertext which w as encrypted with an old key at a later date, even if forced. We shall prove that the problem of decrypting encryptions with earlier keys is related to two problems: the problem of nding elements of large order in Z p and the symmetric Di e-Hellman decision problem. Both problems are believed to be hard (cf. 1, 2 3 ]).
We rst describe our basic protocol in more detail. This combines ideas from 6, 7, 14, 26] .
Setting
The parties involved: the sender Alice, the receiver Bob, a Court, the Law Enforcement Agency LEA, and the Escrow A g e n ts EA i , i = 1 2 : : : .
The parameters: A Discrete Logarithm setting is used. Bob chooses a prime p such that p ; 1 has two large prime factors p 1 p 2 , with p 1 p 2 3 (mod 4), so (;1 j p 1 ) = ( ;1 j p 2 ) = ;1 ( p 1 p 2 is a Blum integer 6]), and an element g 2 Z p whose order is p 1 p 2 . Bob gives p g to all the agents EA i , i = 1 2 : : : , a n d t o Alice. Bob has a long term public key which i s k n o wn to all parties concerned. This key is used for authenticating (signing) Bob's encryption keys and the parameters p g, if required. 
Set-up

The protocol Updating
At time = t Each agent E A i updates his share by squaring it, i.e., the current share is s i 2 t mod (p ; 1), and then destroys the old share (s i 2 t;1 mod (p ; 1)). Bob updates his private key to a 2 t mod (p ; 1) and publishes his public key y t := g a 2 t mod p. If necessary Bob proves to the LEA that this is correct by using an interactive zero-knowledge proof for the Di e-Hellman problem (for example, the interactive proof given in Appendix A). That is, Bob proves that y t = D H ( y t;1 y t;1 ).
Getting an escrowed key , the old shares are destroyed, and Bob's secret key is updated to a 2 t . Observe that a 2 t , for t > 1, has 4 square roots in Z p1 p2 of which only one is a quadratic residue, because of our restrictions on the primes p 1 p 2 . It follows that there is only one primitive 2 u {th root of a 2 t in Z p1 p2 , 0 < u t, which is a quadratic residue. We c o n tinue with the proof. Suppose that there is a polynomial time algorithm A which on input p g z 1 z 2 : : : z, z 1 2 , z 1 2 3 , . . . , z 1 2 ::: `, the shares . Observe t h a t e v en though it is highly unlikely that the public key y t;u is properly constructed when t > u (that is, it is highly unlikely that y t;u = DH( y t;u;1 y t;u;1 ), or that g ). The rest can all be simulated because we h a ve used zero-knowledge proofs.
Generalizations
Generalizing time controlled l-out-of-l key escrow systems to l 0 -out-of-l systems, is straightforward when using more complex secret sharing schemes over Z p;1 ( ). Secret sharing schemes that could be used for this purpose can be found in 15, 12, 2, 5], when using techniques such as those described in 17, 13] . Robustness can be achieved by using, for example 20, 1 9 ] .
Other properties such as proactive secret sharing can also be achieved using 21, 1 8 , 27].
Time controlled auctions with closed bids
We rst consider a basic (additive)`-out-of-`escrow system, using a simple setting. Generalizations will be discussed later.
Our system uses a Discrete Logarithm setting with composite modulus n = p 1 p 2 , where p 1 p 2 are appropriate large primes. The bidder, Alice, chooses n and g 1 g 2 2 Z n such that g 1 has large order whereas g 2 has a rather small prime order q. Alice has two public keys for encryption: y 1 = g a1 1 mod n, y 2 = g a2 2 mod n, where a 1 2 R Z (n) , a 2 2 R Z q . The private key a 1 is shared among`escrow agents EA i , i = 1 2 : : : . The other is not shared. For this system the public key y 2 is weak and must be used only once. T h i s k ey must be such t h a t i t c a n be recovered by an exhaustive search o f t h e k ey space, but the time taken for this search should not be too short. 4 Alice \double" encrypts her contract bid m by using the keys y 1 y 2 . Let ElG 2 (m) be the encryption. Alice sends this to the receiving agent Bob. At completion she will reveal both secret keys a 1 a 2 , from which Bob will get the tendered bid m. If Alice refuses to reveal these keys, then Bob informs the escrow agents who will enable a rst decryption. This will make it possible for Bob to get an encryption ElG(m) o f m with private key a 2 . Bob then initiates a procedure to recover m, b y exhaustively breaking this encryption. Bob can achieve this because the second key is relatively weak. A similar argument applies if a Court order is issued to the escrow a g e n ts to enable the decryption of ElG 2 (m). The security issues of this protocol will be discussed in more detail later. We rst describe the protocol more formally.
Setting
The parties involved: the bidder Alice, the receiving o cer Bob, a Court, the Law Enforcement Agency LEA, and the Escrow A g e n ts EA i , i = 1 2 : : : .
The parameters: Both Alice and Bob have long term public keys which a r e known to each other. These keys are used for authentication (signing). A Discrete Logarithm setting is used with a composite modulus n. Alice chooses n = p 1 p 2 , a product of two large primes p 1 p 2 , with p 1 ;1 = 21 , p 2 ;1 = 22 , q 1 q 2 primes, and q a rather small prime (say 140 bits). Alice chooses g 1 2 R Z n and g 2 2 Z n such that ord(g 2 mod p 1 ) = ord(g 2 mod p 2 ) = q. Here ord(g 2 mod p 1 ) is the order of g 2 in Z p1 and ord(g 2 mod p 2 ) i s t h e order of g 2 in Z p2 . Consequently g 2 has order q in Z n .
Set-up E a c h a g e n t E A i checks that z i = g si and reports failure to the LEA. The LEA checks that g a = z 1 z 2 z`. I f a n y of the checks of the EA i 's fails or if the LEA's check fails then Alice has cheated, the tender is rejected, and appropriate actions are taken.
Sending an encrypted contract bid 1 . Alice sends Bob the pair of her public keys authenticated with her long term key, (n q g 1 g 2 y 1 y 2 sign Alice (g 1 g 2 n q y 1 y 2 )) and the encrypted bid ElG 2 (m) = ( g ): The key for this ciphertext is weak, so the LEA can recover m by brutal force. However, q has to be su ciently large to prevent a conspiracy, as explained further on.
Security
The security of this system relies on the di culty of factoring a numbern = p 1 p 2 , p 1 p 2 primes, when a particular number g 2 Z n is given, with a rather small prime order q. It is important that both g mod p 1 6 = 1 and g mod p 2 6 = 1. Otherwise, if say g mod p 1 = 1 , t h e n p 1 is a factor of g ; 1 and it becomes easy to factor n by taking the gcd(n g ; 1) . Observe that for g = n ; 1 w e h a ve q = 2 , but this trivial case is too small to be of any use for us.
Fair auction bidding
Alice may refuse to open her bid, on completion. Bob will inform the LEA and the Court will authorize the escrow agents to decrypt the ciphertext. The escrow agents will compute y The key for this ciphertext is weak, so the LEA can initiate a procedure to recover m by brutal force. (Note that q has to be su ciently large, as we n o w explain.)
Conspiracy
The agents may be corrupted by the bidding o cer Bob. They will recover ElG(m) = ( g 2 r2 m y 2 r2 ) but if the key y 2 is not too weak they will not be able to recover the message in time. For this reason q cannot be too small. ), will output m. L e t n g 1 y 1 g 1 r1 be an instance of the Di eHellman problem as in 13]. Take s 1 : : : s`; 1 2 R Z n , a n d s = s 1 + : : : + s`; 1 Give as input to A: n q g 1 g 2 y 1 y 2 , a u t h e n ticated with Alice's public key, 
